



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# Briefly Noted

12 April 1965

Religious Habits of Polish Nannies	<u>Status Symbol or Ideological Deviation?</u>
--	--

A Western correspondent in Warsaw reports on the great difficulty in finding maids, governesses, or domestics of any kind in urban centers. Warsaw papers commonly contain scores of maid-wanted ads and not a single ad seeking such employment.

Domestic service in Poland is officially considered capitalistic and exploitative, but the Gomulka regime is said to condone it in view of the perennial threat of unemployment problems.

New maids joining the Warsaw work force are typically in their teens or twenties, often from eastern Poland, where there is less economic opportunity. They are highly independent in their attitudes and demanding as to work conditions. When displeased in any way, they are prone to move off to another domestic job or take work in some factory.

One of the main sources of friction has been the tendency of devout young maids to take the children of their employers regularly to church. The employers are often the elite of the new society, successful, well educated in the sciences, husband and wife both employed.

It is not clear why the church-going of children should cause major difficulty between domestics and their employers. Apparently the parents are worried not so much about religious influences as about the danger that jealous comrades might

see their children going to or from church.

\* \* \*

Quicksand for Intellectuals	<u>Ilyichev: One More Scapegoat</u>
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Leonid F. Ilyichev was appointed one of six Deputy Foreign Ministers to serve under Andrei A. Gromyko -- announced at the Central Committee meeting of the CPSU on 24 March 1965. This removes him from the high rank which he held among CPSU leaders as head of Khrushchev's Ideological Commission within the Central Committee.

The new leadership is wooing intellectuals and artists: as evidence of good faith, they are removing the man who administered the 1962-1963 crackdown on intellectuals and who is most clearly identified with Khrushchev's hardline. Thus, another long-time Party Professional has been penalized for carrying out Party orders. Men are sloughed off as the Party line zigs and zags.

But the new leaders leave intellectuals in suspense: they are promised freedom in selecting methods of work and styles of expression -- as long as they conform to vaguely defined Marxist philosophy and Communist ideology. The CPSU suggests that it is relaxing its controls over intellectuals but maintains a powerful hand over the creative arts. The world sympathizes with the uncertain world of intellectuals in Communist countries and encourages them in their determined stand against political censorship.

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Racial  
Bias


Soviet Interference  
in Ghana

A young Soviet teacher, who was engaged to marry the son of a prominent Lebanese trading family in Ghana, was pursued by Soviet officials there and forcibly returned to the USSR in February. Nothing has been heard of her since. The Ghana press did not carry the story; Ghana police complied with Soviet instructions to arrest the bridegroom, force him to divulge the girl's hiding place, and hold him in jail until she was put on an Aeroflot plane under guard and flown to the USSR.

The girl, Miss Larisa "Lara" Dremyatsakaya, was assigned to the Mfantshipim secondary school in Saltpond, Ghana. Knowing that the Soviet Government would not permit her marriage to a Lebanese, the couple eloped to Kumasi. But the Soviet network of informants started their successful hunt and they brought her back to Accra for the flight home. It would appear that the Soviet Embassy has successfully placed the police of Ghana under its direction, even in cases affecting other foreigners.

The story first appeared in Beirut papers, e.g., Lisan Al-Hal, and in Al-Jumhuriyah (25 February, datelined Nairobi) and was retold in many North African news media.


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



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Note: First cumulative Index covered BPG's #134 through #151 and was contained in BPG #153.


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


















# Significant Dates ▶

## MAY

Month-long refugee exodus from Communist China to Hong Kong; estimated 70,000 cross border. 1962

- 1 May Day: International Workers' Day. Designated by Second International (Socialist) Congress 1889; first celebrated Western Europe 1890; heavily exploited since close of WW II in Communist countries.
- 1 Castro proclaims Cuba a socialist nation; no more elections. 1961
- 2 Berlin falls to Red Army. 1945 (20th anniversary WW II events.)
- 5 Karl Marx born. 1818 (Died 14 March 1883.)
- 6 Inter'l Union of Socialist Youth meeting, 6-9 May, Colombo, Ceylon.
- 6 French defeated by North Vietnam Communists, Dien Bien Phu, 1954.
- 8 VE-Day. Armistice ends World War II in Europe - 1945. (20th anniversary.)
- 11 (Soviet Bloc) Warsaw Pact for military cooperation and mutual aid concluded (11-14 May). Tenth anniversary. 1955
- 15 COMINTERN (third international) dissolved, declaring autonomy of Communist Parties outside USSR. 1943
- 16 Treaty of Aigun, first of "Unequal Treaties" ceding part of Chinese "Great Northeast" west of Amur River to Russia. 1858
- 22 Organization of African Unity (OAU) signed at Addis Ababa, 22-25 May, 1963.
- 23 Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) founded. 45th anniversary. 1920
- 23 Federal Republic of Germany proclaimed (made fully independent 5 May same year, as Western Powers lifted remaining controls). Tenth anniversary. 1955
- 26 Khrushchev speech in Belgrade blaming Soviet side for errors and Beria for break. Tenth anniversary. 1955

# PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE to COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS



#50

Commentary

17-30 March 1965

## Principal Developments:

1. Peking strikes strongly and extensively at the Moscow 19-party "consultative meeting." First, it reports briefly and critically on the meeting, with the texts of CPSU letters on the subject, of 30 July and 24 November 1964 (the latter published for the first time anywhere). Then 2 pages of "comments" on the meeting by 11 of the 19 participants, followed next day by 1 page of excerpts from "comments" by "the Western bourgeois press" (including Yugoslavia!). Then, on the 23rd, an 8,000-word joint People's Daily/Red Flag article totally rejecting all aspects of the meeting and scathingly denouncing the new CPSU leadership. Asserting that this "grave action" has given them the right to take the initiative, the Chinese imply sharply increased measures to "openly criticize and expose" the Soviet revisionist line, and to support and "promote the speedier development" of Chinese-aligned "Marxist-Leninist forces" and "the revolutionary left" throughout the world. Warning that the struggle has "entered a new stage," they again declare that the CPSU leaders can avoid total destruction only by publicly recanting and "returning to Marxism-Leninism." The heretofore unpublished CPSU letter of 24 November 1964, apparently sent to all invitees to the Moscow meeting proposing the postponement from 15 December 1964 to 1 March 1965 reveals that the 19 who did attend had already agreed to participate in December and indicates that the postponement was made and the new note sent largely in an effort (fruitless, of course) to win wider participation.

2. The Chinese attack is preceded by a longer and more colorful Albanian Zeri I Popullit denunciation on the 18th.

3. The Chinese also continue to exploit their campaign on "brutal Soviet repression of the student anti-imperialist demonstration" in Moscow 4 March, and both the Chinese and Albanian articles described above refer to the affair.

4. Soviet media continue to talk unity and adhere to a "no polemics" posture: a 26 March Suslov report on the meeting to a CPSU plenum (which apparently concerned itself largely with economic/agricultural matters) remains secret, but the "appropriate resolution" adopted by the plenum after hearing Suslov uses the same bland terms of approval as previous Soviet comment. TASS reports additional belated "interviews with eyewitnesses" on the "brutal suppression" affair to expose the "shameful farce" of the Chinese provocation and "smear campaign," but the USSR does not reply to the second Chinese note.

5. In contrast to the lack of any public Soviet reaction to the savage Chinese attack, Italian and French Party dailies, L'Unita and L'Humanite, immediately condemn the Chinese insults, arbitrary and false charges, and further damage to unity.

6. The death of Rumania's ailing boss Gheorghiu-Dej elevates a young, vigorous exponent of that Party's independence line, Nicolae Ceausescu, to the First Secretary post. Death and funeral bring high-level delegations and messages from major parties reflecting varying attitudes toward Rumania's independence, ranging from the barely correct Soviet to a polemical Japanese CP note praising Dej's fight against great power chauvinism and opposition to the "splitters' conference."


7. An extended meeting in Stockholm of senior Chinese diplomats in Europe is assumed to plan concrete measures to stimulate the growth of pro-Chinese dissidence among European Communists; this appears to implement the "initiative" which the Chinese say the Moscow meeting has given them the right to take. A Chou-led Chinese delegation to the Dej funeral gives a boost to Albanian morale with a 3-day visit and goes on to Algeria as the period ends -- and as the preparatory commission for the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference is in session there.

8. The Sino-Soviet conflict continues to be complicated by the increasing escalation of warfare in Vietnam. At the end of the period, the Soviets are reportedly telling correspondents in Moscow and advising foreign Communist representatives that China is blocking Soviet efforts to deliver aid to North Vietnam by air and rail across China.

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


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(Commentary Cont.)





CHRONOLOGY -- COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#50

17-30 March 1965

Continuing from March 4: Peking and Moscow media continue to feud on the "brutal suppression" by Soviet police and troops of a student anti-imperialist demonstration at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow March 4 (see Chrono #49 for earlier reports). On the 17th, Radio Peking and NCNA describe more visits to the 4 hospitalized Chinese students by leading Chinese dignitaries, students, workers, servicemen, etc., and by Asian, African and Latin American friends. On the 19th and 21st, NCNA reports that the "brutal suppression" charge was included at mass rallies of Chinese and foreign students in Peking and other Chinese cities and a Peking meeting of foreign diplomats and peace champions representing 41 countries.

On the 20th, TASS reports interviews with Soviet personnel on the plane and at way-stops as the 4 Chinese were flown home: they tell how the 4 appeared healthy until arrival in Peking, when Chinese attendants boarded and made them up to look pale before they were ostentatiously removed on stretchers. TASS also reports interviews with hospital personnel reiterating that the Chinese did not need hospitalization. Same day, TASS also reports that "foreign students in Moscow" "resolutely disassociate themselves from the provocative actions" of the Chinese and from the "smear campaign" conducted by Chinese media.

On the 22nd, TASS adds further eyewitness reports on the 4 March melee by a Sudanese and a Czech student and several Soviet militiamen. The latter describe serious injuries to the militia: "It was not a political demonstration but an attack by students on Soviet militia." One adds that "the Chinese citizens broke the legs of five horses and wounded three with hacksaws."

March 18: Pravda publishes full text of Castro 13 March Havana University speech (see Chrono #49), with its clearly implied criticism of the Soviets as well as the Chinese.

Albanian Party daily Zeri I Popullit 15,000-word editorial on "The Splitting Revisionist Meeting of 1 March -- A Great Plot against M-L and International Communism." Key passages read:

"The Soviet revisionist leadership and its followers have committed a great crime against the WCM and the cause of socialism. Disregarding the earnest advice of the M-L parties, they held their famous meeting in Moscow from 1 March, and thereby took a very dangerous step towards a complete and definitive split in the socialist camp and the ICM.

"This act decisively tore the mask from the present Soviet leaders.... It proves that, alongside N. K. and with him, they are

(Chronology Cont.)

the greatest plotters and splitters the history of the WCM has known, revisionists and incorrigible renegades of M-L, allies and auxiliaries of imperialism."

ZIP colorfully characterizes the 1 March meeting, as "a typical meeting of hardened conspirators who, on the one hand, loudly call for 'unity' and 'cohesion' and, on the other, secretly sharpen the dagger they are preparing to plunge into the back of the revolution."

March 19: Swedish papers report that senior Chinese diplomats in Europe have been conferring at the Chinese Embassy in Stockholm since 10 March, and are expected to continue another week. It is speculated that the purpose is to increase Chinese penetration into the Communist parties of Europe.

March 19-23: Chinese Communist media finally react to the 1 March Moscow "consultative meeting." On the 19th NCNA briefly reports on it, beginning: "A schismatic meeting, convoked by the leadership of the CPSU unilaterally, illegally, and by scraping bits and pieces together, was held in Moscow from 1 to 5 March...." Listing the 19 "units" (not parties) attending, NCNA refers to "the notorious renegade Dange group of India and the splinter revisionist groups of Australia and Brazil." People's Daily publishes this report, together with the texts of the CPSU letters of 30 July 1964, originally calling for the 15 December meeting, and 24 November, proposing postponement to 1 March 1965.

The latter, published for the first time, reveals that the 19 parties who finally came in March had already agreed to participate in the meeting as it was originally planned. The CPSU note seems to have been an effort to win participation of more than the 19 with the postponement: although the text is carefully worded to put the CPSU in the position of agreeing with the others rather than directing, it closes by giving the text of a notice on the postponement which it "suggests" be published by the party press. PD adds that this notice was published by Pravda on 12 December 1964.

People's Daily follows on the 21st with 2 full pages of "comments on the March Moscow meeting by its participants." It prints the full texts of statements and editorial comments representing 11 of the participating parties, all European except the Mongolian.

On the 22nd, People's Daily devotes a full page to "comments by the Western bourgeois press on the schismatic meeting illegally convoked by the new leadership of the CPSU." An editor's note says that "It can be seen from these comments that the capitalist class of these countries... is glad of the meeting and derives malicious pleasure from it. They point out that the meeting convoked by the new CPSU leadership has further split the ICM. They also consider that the meeting, held in confusion and disorder, shows that the baton wielded by K's successors has become less and less effective." Excerpts are printed from media of the U.S., Britain, France, Japan, Italy, West Germany, --- and Yugoslavia!

After this prolonged overture, People's Daily and Red Flag on the 23rd publish an 8,000-word joint "Comment on the March Moscow Meeting." It totally rejects and denounces all aspects of the meeting and the new CPSU leadership, asserts that this "grave action of the new leaders of the CPSU" has given "the Marxist-Leninists of the world the right to take the initiative," announces that "the struggle between the two lines ... has now entered a new stage," and reiterates earlier Chinese warnings that the new CPSU leaders can avoid complete destruction only by publicly recanting and "returning to M-L."

The article is divided into four numbered sections, as follows:

I. What kind of a meeting was it?

"After making herculean efforts and combining hard tactics with soft to knock something together, the leaders of the CPSU finally managed to convene a fragmented meeting. (It) ... was small and most unseemly. It was a gloomy and forlorn affair."

This sections concludes:

"In replacing K, they simply changed the signboard and employed more cunning methods and subterfuges in order the better to push through and develop Khrushchevism and to carry out the general line of revisionism, and splittism which K had put forward at the 20th CPSU Congress, systematized at its 22nd Congress, and embodied in the program of the CPSU."

II. What are the deeds of the new leaders of the CPSU?

... The assertion in the communique of the meeting that "what unites the CPs greatly outweighs that which at the present time divides them" is "sheer hypocrisy." As a matter of fact, the article says, "what unites the new leaders of the CPSU and U.S. imperialism is becoming stronger and stronger and is making them well-nigh inseparable..."

"To sum up, what the new leaders of the CPSU have been doing can be described as 'three shams and three realities': sham anti-imperialism but real capitulation; sham revolution but real betrayal; sham unity but real split. They are still doing what K did, which can be described as 'four alignments with and four alignments against': alignment with imperialism against socialism; alignment with the U.S. against China and the other revolutionary countries; alignment with the reactionaries everywhere against the national liberation movements and the people's revolutions; and alignment with the Tito clique and renegades of all descriptions against all the fraternal M-L parties and all revolutionaries fighting imperialism."

III. Answers to some questions.

The Chinese rebuff the Soviet plea for an end to public polemics:

"Unless they openly announce the withdrawal of their anti-Chinese resolutions, statements and articles, and publicly admit their mistakes, it will be absolutely impossible to silence us." "... it will not do to stop for a single day, for a month, a year, a hundred years, a thousands years, or ten thousand years. If nine thousand years are not enough to complete the refutation, then we shall take ten thousand." It then turns to the Moscow meeting and its continuing, if ambiguous, support of a new international meeting: "We said before that in order to hold a successful meeting for unity, some four or five years of preparatory work might be required to remove the obstacles, but now it seems that a period twice as long, or even longer will be needed."

IV. Unite on the basis of M-L and revolution.

"The grave action of the new leaders of the CPSU in calling the divisive meeting has given the M-L parties and the M-Ls of the world the right to take the initiative. There is all the more reason now why we should openly criticize and thoroughly expose the revisionist line of the new leaders of the CPSU, give more vigorous support to the people's revolutionary movements and the revolutionary left in different countries, and promote the speedier development of the M-L forces and the unity of the ICM on the basis of M-L and the revolution.

"The struggle between the two lines in the ICM has now entered a new stage. At this crucial juncture, we would like once again to give the new leaders of the CPSU a piece of sincere advice. Why should you put your neck into the noose left by K? Why can't you start afresh?... The question hinges on whether or not you will do the following:

Publicly declare that all orders for convening divisive meetings are wrong and illegal. Openly admit the error of illegally convening the schismatic meeting. Publicly and solemnly admit before the Communists and people of the world that K's revisionism, great-power chauvinism, and splittism are wrong.

Publicly admit that the revisionist line and program adopted at the 20th and 22nd Congresses of the CPSU presided over by K are wrong.

Publicly admit that all the words and deeds of the leaders of the CPSU against China, Albania, the Japan CP, and the other M-L parties are wrong.

Publicly pledge yourselves to desist from the error of K revisionism and return to the road of M-L and proletarian internationalism, and to the revolutionary principles of the 1957 declaration and the 1960 statement.

... The show put on by K was but a brief interlude in the history of the ICM.... The subsequent performance of those who want Khrushchevism without K can only be a brief interlude, too.... We are also convinced that the revolutionary people of the world, the great ICM, the great socialist camp, and the great Chinese and Soviet people will finally sweep away all obstacles and unite on the basis of M-L and proletarian internationalism....

March 19-27: Rumanian President and Party First Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej dies on 19th after long illness in Bucharest: he is succeeded as First Secy by 47-year-old Nicolae Ceausescu, a leading exponent of the Party's independence line. Major parties send high-level delegations to funeral, with statements reflecting attitudes toward Rumania's independent role in the ICM. Most pointed were the Japanese: "Gheorghiu-Dej fought firmly against great power chauvinism, defended the sovereignty and national dignity of his country, and played a positive role for unity of the ICM, opposing the splitters' conference, which is the path leading to a definitive split of the WCM" (as published by the Rumanian press). The Soviet message is pro forma and signed impersonally by the CPSU/CC, Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet -- in contrast to most other messages and customary practice. Reportedly the Soviet delegation headed by Mikoyan and the Chinese delegation headed by Chou En-lai did not confer with each other, but they did have separate talks with the Rumanian Party leadership, the Soviet on the 25th and the Chinese on the 26th. Apparently the Chinese delegation was last to leave Rumania, flying on the 27th to Albania.

March 22: Indonesian CP daily Harian Rakjat reports a speech of Chairman Aidit at a political training course in which he said that "revisionism is the twin brother of imperialism."

March 23: The daily organs of the Italian and French parties in brief preliminary comments denounce the Chinese People's Daily/Red Flag joint article of this date blasting the Moscow meeting and the new CPSU leaders. L'Unita declares that "the insults against the Soviets were absurd and unacceptable." "We reject as profoundly arbitrary the charge that the Moscow meeting was schismatic. All the parties attending made a great effort to prevent it from becoming so." L'Humanite reminds Peking that the Chinese supported the 81-party 1960 Moscow statement which endorsed the 20th CPSU Congress as "the opening of a new phase in the ICM."

March 24-26: A CPSU/CC plenum apparently deals primarily with economic/agricultural matters, devoting considerable publicity to a new program of greatly increased investment in agriculture and second-level personnel shifts. On the 26th, it hears a report on the consultative meeting by

Suslov and "adopted an appropriate resolution." The Suslov report is still a tightly held secret, and the resolution, released on the 26th, follows the bland communique of the meeting, approving all the meeting's conclusions. A 28 March Pravda editorial on the plenum devotes only one paragraph to this aspect of the plenum's work.

March 25: The Paris weekly Nouvel Observateur publishes a Chou En-lai interview given to K.S. Karol (exile Polish journalist for New Statesman and other liberal European publications) in Peking. (Also appears in London New Statesman on 26th.) Admitting that during his November 1964 visit to Moscow he attempted to persuade the new CPSU leaders against convening their scissionist meeting, Chou indicates that the main Chinese objection to the planned meeting was that it excluded the real Communist representatives of certain countries and included renegade groups instead. He singled out the "renegade Dange group in India" for special attack.

March 27: TASS announces that Mikoyan will visit Hungary and Brezhnev Poland at the beginning of April.

March 27-30: Chinese delegation headed by Chou En-lai is gratefully welcomed in Albania. In his speech at a rally on the 29th, Chou includes a denunciation of the March "splitters' meeting" in Moscow.

March 28: Neues Deutschland publishes an abridged text of East German delegation chief Matern's presentation to the 19-party Moscow consultative meeting. Noteworthy is his strong emphasis on the need for a world conference.

Correspondents in Moscow report that, according to "persistent reports from Communist sources" there, the Chinese are obstructing Soviet arms shipments to North Vietnam, dragging their feet on negotiations for trans-shipments through China and delaying shipments which have already crossed the border.

March 29: NCNA announces the publication of the fourth volume of State-ments by Khrushchev by Peking's World Knowledge Publishing House: it contains "64 of K's speeches, letters, and articles published in 1955."

A Pravda editorial, "The True Way to Strengthen Unity," extolls the Moscow consultative meeting, the February Kosygin mission to N. Vietnam and N. Korea, and the forthcoming Brezhnev visit to Poland and Mikoyan visit to Hungary.

March 30: Chou En-lai delegation flies from Albania to Algeria, where correspondents note that his "hastily arranged" visit coincides with the fifth meeting of the preparatory commission for the Afro-Asian summit meeting scheduled to open in Algiers June 29. "Informed sources said that Chou will reiterate Chinese opposition to the admission of Russia to the conference."

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
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
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YUGOSLAV CRITIC OF SOVIETS ARRESTED

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SITUATION: In January and February 1965, a Yugoslavian literary monthly, Delo, published two articles in an outspoken series on the Soviet literary and social scene, written by Professor Mihajlo Mihajlov, a 30-year-old teacher of literature at the University of Zadar; the title of the series was "Moscow Summer 1964." These articles have created a stir recalling that set off by Milovan Djilas's Conversations With Stalin. On 6 February, shortly after the February issue of Delo appeared, Yugoslav authorities confiscated all copies of that issue. It was reported on 4 March that Marshal Tito himself had denounced the Mihajlov articles on 11 February, telling a group of public prosecutors that they had been negligent in not indicting Mihajlov. Also on 11 February, Komunist, the Yugoslav Central Committee's weekly, suggested that Mihajlov wrote as though he came "from the emigre gutter, with its hopeless funeral dirges," rather than from Yugoslavia: Komunist also warned, "In our democratic development, one cannot tolerate essentially anti-Socialist outbursts, made under the guise of a struggle of opinions and freedom of discussion."

In referring to "the emigre gutter," Komunist's editors appear to have been hinting at Mihajlov's Russian exile parentage, and on 28 February a Belgrade weekly, Nin, resumed this theme in a more obvious way, saying that Mihajlov's articles "have the mouldy smell of the dirt masticated long ago in the White Guardist kitchens," and calling Mihajlov "a White Guard interventionist," thus associating Mihajlov with the counter-revolutionary forces of the Russian Civil War period. Mihajlov, enraged, wrote a letter to the editor of Nin, restating his philosophy, telling the editor he despised him, and protesting that his father had lived in and served Yugoslavia for many years (his father had come from Russia at 17 and his mother at 7), while he himself had been born and bred in Yugoslavia. On the assumption (doubtless correct) that Nin would never publish such a letter, Mihajlov mailed out 290 copies of it, thus aggravating his offense. On 11 March a Yugoslav government spokesman revealed that Mihajlov had been arrested and was under interrogation.

On 26 March, Mihajlov and Miloslav Mirkovic (the responsible editor of Delo) were indicted under Article 175 of the Yugoslav criminal code, which provides for not less than three months imprisonment for "damaging the reputation of a foreign state." Mihajlov will also be tried for sending copies of the February Delo to an Italian editor after the ban went into effect; the distribution of banned material may be punished by up to a year in jail. The trial will probably be held in Zadar, in early April.

Basically, Mihajlov's articles were a description of Soviet life today, as seen by a literary critic. Only a part of Mihajlov's material was published. His self-assigned main task was to report on the views of various "liberal" writers, chiefly novelists, and secondarily, on currents in the outlook of Soviet youth. He talked with, among others, N.K. Gudziy and Boris Mikhailovski, literary historians; Vladimir Dudintsev, author of Not by Bread Alone; Tamara Zirmunskaya, a young poetess; Leonid Leonov and Ilya Ehrenburg, writers of the older generation; Bela Akhmadulina, a leading figure in Soviet poetry; Yuri Bondarev and Vladimir Tendryakov, controversial novelists; and Bulat Okudzhava, a ballad singer. No doubt these people spoke more freely with this visiting Yugoslav than they would have done with someone from a capitalist country. As reported by Mihajlov, most of these figures were preoccupied with disposing with Stalinism and the past, and several of them still suffer some form of restraint in the publication of their writings, though several of them, Ehrenburg in particular, defended the goals of socialism. Mihajlov also described the rebellious spirit of Soviet youth, who enjoy singing songs from the slave labor camps, and he relates that one Soviet student remarked about the leaders: "They have rehabilitated only their own people. And thousands of honest people, non-Party people--what about them?"

Mihajlov himself is more than disenchanted with Communism. An avowed Christian and an admirer of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, he even makes disrespectful remarks about Lenin, saying that the corpse in the tomb is "probably" genuine and not made of wax-- "if he were made of wax, he would look more natural." The Soviet practice of naming everything after Lenin leads him to say: "Strange, that people do not notice that that which is always repeated loses all meaning." He comments ironically on the fact that almost every house on Gorki Street (he says students call this street "the Moscow Broadway") has a historical marker, showing that some Bolshevik writer lived there or that "Lenin spoke there on such and such a day in the year 1918 or 1919 or 1922." Mihajlov points out that the Soviet press makes fewer and fewer references to Nazi concentration camps and avoids comparing them with Soviet camps:

"That is understandable. The first 'death camps' were set up, not by the Germans but by the Soviets. In 1921, not far from Archangel, the first 'death camp,' Holmogor, began to function. It served no other purpose but the physical annihilation of prisoners. It operated successfully for years, and swallowed up the one-time political allies--the members of the non-Bolshevik revolutionary parties (the Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, etc.)."

Thus Mihajlov not only makes the Soviets the inventors of death camps, he also dates the first of these camps in the period when Lenin ruled the Soviet Union, long before the days of the "personality cult," and names as its victims the non-Bolsheviks who had formed a "united front" with Lenin.

Turning to genocide, Mihajlov finds that here, too, the Soviets preceded the Germans:

"Before the Second World War, many small nations from the border areas near Turkey, Iran and Persia (sic) were deported to northern Siberia, where, being unaccustomed to the cold, they died like flies. It is completely understandable that many units of the Red Army, which were predominately composed of Kalmucks, Tartars, and Circassians, and which were exposed to severe reprisals, went over to the side of the Hitlerian criminals."

The references to camps and genocide occur in the banned February Delo. Mihajlov also notes other lesser blemishes on Soviet life today: crime ("It is dangerous to go in the streets at night in the remote parts of the city"); drunkenness ("In the evening one meets drunken people in abundance"); rudeness ("But the relations between people are hopelessly rough"); and the attempts of the regime to stifle criticism ("In spite of the continuous threat of being sent to the so-called 'work colonies' for one or two years, the students are afraid of nothing"). Mihajlov also tells of his Kafkaesque efforts to make contact with one Yakov Emanuelovich Golosovker, who had written a book on Dostoevsky and Kant; people said either they didn't know where Golosovker was, or they said he was in a hospital the name of which they could not divulge--and that in any case he was allowed no visitors. Mihajlov does not say so, but we are led to suspect that Golosovker's hospital really serves as a prison; according to other sources, Mikhail Naritsa, Valeriy Tarsis, and Aleksandr Yesenin-Volpin have been silenced by being placed in mental hospitals.


Despite Tito's remarks, allegedly made on 11 February, it is possible that the Yugoslav government would not have indicted Mihajlov on its own initiative. While the whole bent of the articles must have irritated readers like Marshal Tito, Yugoslavia is also proud of having fewer restrictions on its press than other Communist governments. There is nothing in the articles which is anti-Yugoslav or anti-Tito; indeed, Mihajlov claims that "Yugoslavia's presence in Russia is far stronger than that of Russia in Yugoslavia." The Yugoslav press, in its attacks on Mihajlov, has mainly stressed the damage to friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and the editors of Delo, in their self-critical apology in their March issue, explained the need for preventing such "irresponsible journalism" by saying that "permanent mutual cooperation" was necessary between Yugoslavs and Soviets, so as to prevent attacks in either country on conditions in the other. This seems to be a hint that there would have been no indictments without Soviet pressure. There are reports of Soviet protests as early as 5 February, and according to the Washington Evening Star (17 March 1965, Press Comment, 22 March) the Soviet Ambassador has twice complained to Tito. The New York Times (15 March 1965; in Press Comment 15 March) has reported under a Belgrade dateline that, according to "an authoritative East European source," the Soviet Ambassador on 27 February presented Tito with a note which amounted to "a veritable cannonade," hinting that the Yugoslav government itself was behind the article. If this story is true, the Soviet démarche in some respects recalls the

Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia in July 1914, when the Habsburg Monarchy demanded that the Serbian government suppress anti-Austrian agitation. Like Franz Joseph's government, Moscow is impelled to act by its internal weaknesses.

It can hardly be the disclosure of the existence of Soviet death camps that is so disturbing to Moscow; all this has been said before, partly by N.S. Khrushchev. The Yugoslav anti-Mihajlov campaign makes much of his irreverence toward Lenin and the odious comparison with the Nazis, but these seem to be only the most convenient sticks with which to beat the writer. More serious, no doubt, is the demonstration that the Soviet regime has been cruel and repressive from the early 1920's, and that vast numbers of Soviet citizens, and not just party officials, have suffered. Mihajlov reveals something of the scale and duration of the repressions, which has never been done in the USSR, and since Yugoslav publications circulate in the USSR with little restriction and are read receptively, Soviet officials were naturally disturbed.

But the most serious aspect of Mihajlov's articles, from the Kremlin's point of view, is doubtless the picture they give of present-day Russia. These articles suggest that the regime, after committing unforgivable crimes, is now mistaken in its hope that they will be forgotten; that the ideology is bankrupt and barren; that the Soviet citizen longs for change and novelty; that there is a desire for freedom and democracy; and that the younger generation is alienated from its elders. Worst of all, Mihajlov suggests that people are optimistic; they expect much greater changes, perhaps "the third revolution." He writes "The outstanding feature of present-day Soviet literary life is a preparation for and expectation of a new, great and final liberation of literature and arts from all shackles of dogmatic Marxism." The articles suggest a situation ripe for upheaval; one imagines that a perceptive visitor might have written in this vein after a trip to Paris in the 1780's, or to Vienna or St. Petersburg in the early 1900's. Mihajlov's own views are somewhat eccentric, but his portrayal of Soviet society is confirmed from many other sources. If seen by Soviet readers, the articles would evoke a reaction of "How true this is! And how different from the official line."

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CEYLON: SOCIALISTS LOSE  
AFTER COMMUNIST ALLIANCE

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SITUATION: General. In March 1964, left leaning Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, facing a Parliamentary crisis and a possible no-confidence vote, declared a "state of emergency" and prorogued Parliament for the full statutory limit of four months. In an attempt to retain power, she joined her Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in a government coalition with the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP). The coalition, which enjoyed the Parliamentary support of the Communist Party (Soviet Faction), garnered enough votes to enable Bandaranaike to form a new cabinet in June, 1964, which included three Trotskyite members. Inability to cope with Ceylon's growing economic problems and abortive legislation introduced by Trotskyite Cabinet Members alienated important governmental and public power groups. In December 1964, the SLFP's right wing defected to the opposition and the coalition fell. General elections were called for March 22, 1965. Bandaranaike's SLFP formed another coalition with the Trotskyite LSSP and with the support of the CP (Soviet Faction) to contest the election. Following an aggressive anti-Communist campaign which exploited Bandaranaike's coalition with the Marxists, the Ceylonese voters on March 22, 1965 repudiated Bandaranaike's leftward drive and returned the socialist/democratic United National Party (UNP) headed by Dudley Senenayake to power.

Mrs. Bandaranaike's problems and gambles. In the general elections of July 1960, Bandaranaike's SLFP won a rather decisive victory by collecting 75 of 151 Parliament seats. Time and domestic strife eroded the SLFP's dominant position. It proved unprepared to cope with recurring labor strikes, growing financial problems, rising prices, consumer goods shortages and growing public discontent. Bandaranaike turned more and more towards the Sino-Soviet bloc for financial aid and guidance. Following nationalization of western oil interests in Ceylon, and the resultant suspension of US aid required by US legislation in the absence of steps to pay compensation, Bandaranaike's neutralism assumed a definite Communist Bloc tint. Finally, the domestic crisis of the Spring of 1964, precipitated by labor strife, created disaffection within the SLFP with Bandaranaike's leftward drift. To retain power, Bandaranaike, the world's first woman Prime Minister, gambled and formed a Coalition with the most influential of Ceylon's Marxist parties.

Coalition Government. The coalition government accelerated Ceylon's leftward drift; the trend toward increased trade and relations with the Sino-Soviet world increased as Western influence decreased. The much heralded Trotskyite economist, N.M. Perera, who became Finance Minister, failed to work his long promised economic miracles. The Trotskyites,



however, proved a highly vocal partner and virtually became the Government's spokesmen, despite the fact that the SLFP was still the majority party. Ceylon's economy continued to falter, and foreign reserves fell to an all time low. The economy's steady deterioration provided ammunition for increased opposition attack. Additionally, the Trotskyites pushed unwise legislation. An abortive attempt to nationalize the press inspired the important newspaper chains to mount an aggressive anti-Government campaign which emphasized certain Trotskyite sponsored measures which were made to appear deleterious to the interest of the important Buddhist community. Opposition rallied behind Senanayake's UNP which in December 1964 resulted in the defection of the SLFP's right wing, destroyed the SLFP's Parliamentary majority, and precipitated the March 22, 1965 elections.

The Campaign. The Opposition led by Dudley Senanayake mounted an extensive propaganda campaign, exploiting Bandaranaike's campaign coalition with the Marxists. The UNP had steadily built up its flow of anti-Communist propaganda since 1960. The 1965 campaign, based on this foundation, made three basic themes the campaign issues -- democracy vs Marxist dictatorship, the threat of Communism to Buddhism, and Foreign (Soviet and Chinese) interference in Ceylon's domestic affairs. The opposition propaganda barrage was so extensive that from the very beginning the coalition partners were placed on the defensive and remained there throughout the campaign; they attempted to wage the battle on the very issues where they were most vulnerable.

Lay and clerical Buddhist leaders picked up the charge of Marxist threat to Buddhism in Ceylon -- e.g., citing Chinese Communist penetration of Buddhist groups, detailing the fate of Tibet's Buddhist leaders and people (in newspapers and on films shown at Buddhist temples throughout the island), pointing out the conflict between Communist ideology and the exercise of religious freedom. Through their chain of periodicals, many Buddhists electioneered against Bandaranaike's coalition forces and supplemented this propaganda with a drive that sent Buddhist monks from house to house spreading anti-Communist propaganda themes.

The campaign to expose the threat of Communist intervention through the control and manipulation of coalition parties included a myriad of charges against Chinese Communist and Soviet Embassy activity (including the identification by name and activity of eight Soviet and two Chinese intelligence officers in Ceylon). These charges were supported by reporting anti-Communist incidents from around the world, for example, the expulsion of Chinese Communist representatives from Brazil and the exposures of the Chinese activity in Burundi.


The campaign succeeded in bringing to the surface of Ceylonese popular consciousness a fear of domestic Marxism and of Chinese and Soviet interference. Coalition campaign agreements between the SLFP and the Marxist parties were responsible for assisting SLFP victories in 1956 and 1960 by permitting the contestants to work out no-contest pacts which prevented the splitting of the leftist vote. In the 1965 campaign, the intensive

anti-Communist barrage turned an historical advantage to a disadvantage and made the Communist Coalition a vulnerability which ultimately had a decisive impact on the election outcome.

Election Results: On March 22, 1965, the SLFP's majority dwindled from the July 1960 high of 75 to 41 seats; the pro-western UNP rose from 29 in 1960 to 66 seats. The UNP's campaign partner, the right wing of the SLFP which contested as an independent party with a UNP no-contest agreement, acquired five seats. In addition at least six other independents and members of minor parties pledged to support a Senanayake Government. Finally, Ceylon's Hindu Tamil minority party, the Federal Party, agreed to throw in its 14 seats with Senanayake's majority and form a "national" government; in return, the Tamils were rewarded with a cabinet seat. The communist parties acquired 14 seats, a loss of two from the 16 seats of 1960; but they face possible charges of election fraud in at least six districts.

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




893.

COMMUNISTS REJECT NEGOTIATIONS IN VIETNAM

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SITUATION: On 23 March 1965, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV), who describe themselves and are described by both the CPSU and the CCP as the "only true representative of the South Vietnamese people," issued a lengthy five-point statement, point two of which included the following passage:

"At the present time all negotiations are utterly useless unless the U.S. imperialists withdraw all their troops, weapons, and means of war ... and dismantle all their military bases in South Vietnam."

This statement was immediately given maximum publicity by both Hanoi and Peking.

However, this was neither a new position taken by the NFLSV nor different from that of Hanoi or Peking. For example, on 18 March, Hanoi's Nhan Dan, the official organ of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, said in an editorial:

"there can be no question of negotiating with the American imperialists when they openly wage aggressive war in South Vietnam and expand the war to the North. To solve the Vietnamese problem, the U.S. must stop the war and withdraw all of their troops. Without this it is impossible to solve the problem."

The chairman of the NFLSV, Nguyen Huu Tho, in a widely publicized interview with the Communist journalist Wilfred Burchett, said:

"Let's have no further talk about negotiations. It is only a campaign to deceive the people while the U.S. plans further aggression."

The Peking People's Daily editorial for 29 March made the Chicom position equally clear: "If the United States wants negotiations, it must immediately end aggression in Vietnam and withdraw all armed forces from South Vietnam. Only in this way can there be any talk about a negotiated settlement." On a number of occasions Chicom spokesmen have said that those who call for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam are just "day-dreamers."

These quotations are not isolated remarks, but the central theme in all comment from Hanoi and Peking on the situation in Vietnam. So long as the Communists estimate that they are winning the war in Vietnam or that negotiations are not in their favor they will continue this line. If in the course of future developments they should be forced to reverse their estimate and decide to negotiate, they will be in the position of being able to pretend that they have already made a concession simply by agreeing to negotiate. They will then demand that the U.S. and their South Vietnamese allies make a real concession as an indication of their good faith.

Hanoi and Peking have denounced all proposals for a negotiated settlement regardless of the source. President Tito of Yugoslavia has attempted to set up a conference of non-aligned nations to urge all interested parties to seek a negotiated settlement on Vietnam. Both Hanoi and Peking immediately denounced Tito as a "stool pigeon of the United States," and accused him of attempting "to use the banner of false peace to win influence" among the non-aligned nations. Similarly, a 9 March New China News Agency dispatch accused the Indian Government of trying to convene a "Geneva-type conference" in order to help "the Americans out of their worsening dilemma."

The 23 March NFLSV statement quoted above also sets the stage for another tactic to be used by the Communists. The statement emphasizes that "Vietnam is one, the Vietnamese people are one, North and South are one." It attributes identical goals to the North Vietnamese government and the South Vietnamese people. These goals are "to oust the U.S. imperialists, to liberate South Vietnam, to defend North Vietnam and to advance toward the reunification of the country." The statement makes clear that there is no question of any discussion of North Vietnam; South Vietnam is the area to be "neutralized" by the withdrawal of U.S. military presence. After that, the Vietnamese people, under the leadership of the Communist NFLSV, will be left free to work out the reunification of all of Vietnam without the interference of non-Communists.

A further tactic to be expected from the Communists, should they find themselves in circumstances that force them (or when they prefer) to negotiate, is to make certain that any instrumentality designed to supervise and enforce a negotiated settlement is too cumbersome to be able to carry out its functions. An excellent example is the International Control Commission (ICC) set up in 1954 to police the Geneva Agreements. The ICC consists of one Communist member, one non-Communist and one neutralist or non-aligned. Its capacity for positive action is so circumscribed by procedural rules and regulations that effective control of the Agreements is impossible. The example of Laos is indicative of what the Communists would try to do in a South Vietnam that had been neutralized by negotiations. In the ten years since the first Geneva Agreements, the Communists have alternately adopted hard and soft lines in Laos, sometimes resorting to open military attacks against neutralist and rightist

positions and at other times relying on negotiating at the conference table. Both tactics have served them well and each crisis they have fomented has brought them new benefits. The Communist Pathet Lao forces have refused to allow the ICC access to the territories under their control and this has allowed Hanoi and Peking to continue to support the Communist Pathet Lao forces and to use major parts of Laos as a privileged sanctuary for their guerrilla forces operating against South Vietnam. Any headlong rush to the conference table based on a "peace at any price" attitude would only make it easier for the Communists to achieve their goal of dominating Southeast Asia.

It is the Chinese Communists alone who have made the stakes so high in South Vietnam. They have proclaimed that the "liberation war" in South Vietnam is the model for all peoples who are or have recently emerged from colonial controls. In so doing, they are forcing the rest of the world -- including the neutralist or non-aligned countries whether they recognize it or not -- either to make the sacrifices required to defeat them, or to accept the Chicom thesis by giving in and allowing the Communist takeover of South Vietnam. If they succeed in South Vietnam, they will be free to proceed to their next immediate victim -- they have already announced that it will be Thailand -- and throughout the underdeveloped parts of the world they will become the proven expert and authoritative spokesman for every extremist and lunatic element.

The Chicoms did not force the stakes to this level solely because of their geographic interest in Vietnam. Their interpretation of revolutionary ideology (which reaches further back than Marx's Communism) and their desire to seize the leadership of the world Communist movement explains why South Vietnam has been subjected to such long, devastating punishment. This mentality and outlook is also the reason why the free world must remain steadfast in support of the people of South Vietnam.


[See following issues of Press Comment for additional background information:

18 March, page 28 "Peking Dismisses U.S. Talk of Peace."

25 March, page 31 "Peking Will Send Men to Vietnam if Asked."

29 March, page 34, Chou En-lai Statement.]

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WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL

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SITUATION: The Ninth World Youth Festival (WYF) to be held in Algiers from 28 July to 7 August will be attended by delegations from some 60 countries, including most of those from Africa and the Bloc. Ben Bella, who chairs the Algerian national preparatory committee, appears determined to give the WYF a pan-African, pan-Arab coloring. He probably also intends to use the WYF as a platform for demonstrating Algeria's and other developing nations' independent posture between Moscow and Peking as well as between East and West. Notwithstanding Ben Bella's efforts to inject a new image and role into the WYF, there is no reason to believe that this Festival will not again become a grandiosely and expensively staged Communist meeting to exploit the youth of the world.

National (non-Communist) youth organizations are now facing decisions on participation or boycott. Participation means confrontation and debate with the Communist sponsors and manipulators [i.e., the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the International Union of Students (IUS) and the Soviets] but also Communist propaganda exploitation of their very presence, no matter how they define their participation or what their oppositional views may be at the Festival. Boycott, on the other hand means to leave the field exclusively to the Communists and to contribute in a sense to creating an image, as far as the average participant from the "third world" is concerned, that the world's youth supports the Soviet peaceful coexistence concept and that Western "imperialism" and "neo-colonialism" threaten world peace. Non-Communist participants must be prepared to accept the fact that they will not be able to change the political direction of the Festival per se or the political attitudes of controlled delegations; but they can, in private and preferably in public debate, demonstrate that the Festival manipulators and their political friends are presenting one-sided views on world affairs which are far from universally shared among the world's youth.

One of the chief vulnerabilities of the WYF is the Sino-Soviet disension. Chicom objectives are not yet clear. It would seem, however, that the Chicoms and their supporters will not be able to muster sufficient strength to turn the Festival into a conclave responsive to their militant policies. They may make some progress in weakening Soviet control over the WFDY and IUS with the longer range objective of advancing their plans for launching Chicom-controlled international organizations in the youth and student fields. The Chicoms and delegations backing them



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can be expected to challenge Soviet control and Soviet positions on a number of cold war and Sino-Soviet issues, particularly on those of primary concern to the "third world." However, the conflict will in no way affect the over-all Communist control of the Festival.

The Executive Committee of the WFDY will meet in Accra, Ghana beginning on 15 April. Following it, the Ghana Young Pioneers will hold a seminar for African youth leaders, supported by the WFDY, on "The Role of Youth in Changing African Society." The two organizations jointly will stage an international demonstration on 24 April, celebrating "International Youth Day against Colonialism and for Peaceful Co-existence." The WFDY meeting will undoubtedly deal with WYF policy questions. The interlocking affairs also suggest that the Soviets, who control the WFDY, may be attempting to make sure that the majority of African delegations will be responsive to their policies at Algiers.

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


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Fact Sheet

~~Background Use Only~~

12 April 1965

A Document by the Politburo of the French CP Concerning  
a Letter by Communist University Professors

Following is an English translation of an unsigned article entitled, "A French Communist Party Politburo Document" from the French-language daily organ of the French CP, l'Humanite (Humanity), Paris, 17 Feb 65. (Note: The internal headings are by the editors of l'Humanite.)

"A number of communist University instructors sent a letter to comrade Waldeck Rochet, Secretary-General of the Party. Inasmuch as this letter has been printed in the bourgeois press, the Politburo decided to make public the document which it is sending to the Party organizations to which the signers of the letter belong.

We are herewith printing this document, alongside the letter which these University instructors sent to the Party's Secretary-General.

The Letter Sent to the Party's Secretary-General

Dear Comrade,

No communist can remain indifferent to the situation within the Union of Communist Students, to the differences that have arisen there, to the controversy that is now public knowledge.

By our profession, we are in close contact with the student masses; it is our function to transmit to them not only technical knowledge but a general culture. In this way, and also by our participation in the ideological activity of the Party, we are contributing to the spreading of Marxism among them and to their theoretical and political training. In other words, we feel that we are involved in the problems which concern them both as communists and as intellectuals, and that as communist intellectuals we bear a special responsibility.

We are not authorized to intervene in a discussion that is taking place within the Union and also between the Union and the regular jurisdictions of the Party. We have no intention either of weighing responsibilities or of making judgments on the basic issues being debated. The step that we are taking is being made on a different level. We believed it to be our duty, and in the Party's interest, to advise you of our views on an essential matter.

It is obvious that the crisis which has arisen within the Union transcends the bounds of purely student affairs. In the form that this crisis has presently taken, it of course does relate to the particular affairs of that organization, but it could only have arisen and developed

in a more general context: the difficulties that confront the international communist movement, the discussions that have been carried on since the 20th Congress, and the manner in which these problems have been made public and have been variously presented by the different communist parties. In this sense, the crisis within the Union seems to us to be the expression, among the students, of the uneasiness that French communist intellectuals have, in general, felt for the past several years, and to which some of us have already called the attention of the Party leadership, requesting that it take the initiative in inaugurating a broad discussion of the problems connected with the relationship between the Party and the intellectuals: to wit, what is the particular role played -- the specific contribution made -- by communist intellectuals in basic Marxist theoretical studies; what is their role in the necessary work of information, research, and collective reflection, whether in connection with the various aspects of the ideological struggle or the political struggle; what are their duties and their responsibilities in relation to the working class and the Party; what does the Party have the right to demand of them; and what do they have the right to expect from the Party in order that their participation in the general struggle of the working class may be maximally effective and in order that, correspondingly, the Party's action among intellectuals, artists, scholars, cadres and technicians may be conducted under conditions that will permit the great mass of them to be won over to the cause of communism. If this discussion had been undertaken, by the Party and in the Party, certain of the current difficulties could undoubtedly have been avoided.

The problems thus stated are real ones. They concern first of all, of course, the work of the Party among students and among intellectuals; but they also involve -- through an analysis of French society, of the place and the role therein of the intellectuals -- our short-term and long-range political prospects, and certain of the theoretical bases of the present strategy of the working-class movement. No administrative measure can substitute for a discussion the need for which seems to us to be more pressing than ever before.

To avoid a confrontation, to classify intellectuals as good or bad in accordance with their position in the dispute rather than their militant action and their devotion to the cause of communism, would have serious consequences not only among the students, where such an attitude would run the risk of causing a marked diminution of our influence and our numbers, but also among intellectuals, where it would cause confusion, disorganization and bitterness in our ranks, giving rise to distrust and disillusionment among our friends and great joy among our enemies.

In a general way, it would also make more difficult -- in our relations with other groups and with the masses -- the Party's unifying action, its policy of uniting the people against personal government, for genuine democracy, for socialism.

The situation, consequently, strikes us as a serious one. To avoid the dangers it holds, we feel it is necessary to organize "study

days" among communist intellectuals during which the questions that we have raised could be discussed.

Please be assured, dear Comrade, of our fraternal regards.

The Letter to the Party Organizations

Paris, 16 February 1965

Dear Comrades,

A number of University instructors who belong to different cells, sections and federations have sent a letter to comrade Waldeck Rochet, Secretary-General of the Party. Some of the signatories are members of your organization. We are therefore sending you a copy of this letter, together with our initial comments.

In their letter, the signatories request "the initiation of a broad discussion of the problems connected with the relationship between the Party and the intellectuals." Actually, all conditions do exist within the Party for an examination of the questions posed by life. The various Party congresses, in their preparation as well as in their resolutions, have, as you know, studied the problems of the work of the Party among intellectuals. Recently, the 17th Congress provided clear responses, notably in the Central Committee's report submitted by comrade Waldeck Rochet and adopted unanimously by the Congress.

The Replies of the 17th Congress

The Congress stressed the irreplaceable contribution of communist and non-communist intellectuals to the development of science and culture, and the place occupied by intellectuals in society. The ranks, and the role, of the intellectuals are increasing despite the fact that monopoly domination restricts the progress of the productive forces of society. And because this is true, intellectuals have a more definite awareness that they represent a social force which is capable of influencing the evolution of society.

Many intellectuals now are convinced that their future is not linked to that of capitalism. Intellectuals in general, because of the material and intellectual constraints imposed on them by the system of personal government, have serious ideological and ethical reasons for taking part in the struggles for democracy.

The Party's policy is a response to their questions regarding the country's future. The Party endeavors, through its program, to provide solutions for their particular problems.

The Congress has focused attention upon the role of the communist intellectuals in the Party's general effort. Since its birth, our Party has been honored to number great intellectuals in its ranks. Today,

thousands of intellectuals are communists. They have an important place in the development of Party theory and policy, and also in the elaboration of the Party's positions in the various fields of cultural activity. As comrade Waldeck Rochet declared in the Central Committee's report to the 17th Congress, the presence of these intellectuals in Party ranks "corresponds to a necessity in connection with the activity of the Party of the Working Class, because in their capacity as bearers of knowledge and as creators, their contribution is irreplaceable."

The Party helps communist intellectuals to reject ideological compromise and to keep the instrument of political struggle, of scientific research and of artistic creation that is Marxism-Leninism from being transformed into dogma. It encourages them to undertake, with ever greater daring and independence of judgment, the discussion of questions that arise in their fields. It is committed to implement a system of relations and of work that permits communist and non-communist intellectuals to place their knowledge, their talents, and their methods of research at the service of the struggle for the liberation of humanity.

Such an orientation makes fruitful labor possible. It opens up a vast area for numerous initiatives that serve to mobilize intellectuals in the defense and for the future of culture, education and science, and that promote more extensive dissemination of Party theory and policy.

Numerous communist intellectuals who are members of Party councils, or working committees established in conjunction therewith, are taking an active and responsible part in the implementation of this policy. Important initiatives are now being developed in many fields of study, especially among the University teaching staff. The Party is endeavoring to create, in a climate of confidence, the most favorable conditions possible for this activity, and to give to every communist intellectual the opportunity of making his full contribution in a creative manner.

#### The Efforts of All Communists

In implementing this policy and this practice, discussion and improvement of our methods of work are necessary to carry forward an activity the enrichment of which is dependent on the efforts of all communists.

Instead of contributing to this collective effort, the signatories of the letter pass over in silence the orientation determined by the recent Party congress, the initiatives now in progress, and the prospects which they offer. The signatories ask for initiation of a discussion of these questions as though conditions for productive labor did not exist. One may therefore wonder what it is that they desire.

Actually, the signers of the letter bring up many problems that concern the whole of Party policy, tactics and strategy. In so doing they are taking up questions that were already decided, in 1961, by the 16th Party Congress, and these decisions have played a role in the changes

that have since taken place in the French political situation. Recently, the 17th Party Congress enriched this policy and furnished valid answers to the great problems of today which relate to the nature of our era: the problems of peace and war, of the fight for democracy, of the transition to socialism, of working-class unity and the union of the democratic forces, and of the unity and cohesion of the world communist movement.

Party policy brings perspective to the intellectuals, as well as to the other social classes, victims each in their own way of the policy of monopolies. Party policy highlights the need for rallying the democratic forces around the working class with a view to ending personal government and installing a true democracy as a stage on the road to socialism.

Naturally, life poses new problems. These demand of the Party a constant effort toward their solution. This, precisely, is the concern of the whole Party. It is not only the right, but the duty, of every communist to contribute to this effort by his reflection and by his action.

This does not appear to be the concern of the signatories, as expressed in their letter. The step they have taken is in effect a new challenge to the policy that was democratically decided by the Congress. We may add that general Party policy is determined by all communists, including the intellectuals, and not by any one category among them, irrespective of the identity of that category.

#### The Meaning of the Step That Was Taken

The signers of the letter cite the differences among certain leaders of the UEC [Union des Etudiants Communistes; Union of Communist Students] to explain the step they have taken. These differences are real. The statement, however, that "no administrative measure can substitute for a discussion" does not reflect the real situation. These differences have existed for years. The 16th Party Congress, in particular, rejected the erroneous ideas that have not been renounced by certain comrades. Far from resorting to administrative measures, the Party has been guided by the orientation laid down notably at the May 1963 session of the Central Committee, when its replies to the questions that were raised were intended to convince the comrades who were in disagreement, and to contribute to the positive development of the UEC and of its influence among the students.

Today, certain leaders of the UEC, profiting from outside support, have resorted to an open and public attack on the Party, its policies, its principles, and its militants, all in an attempt to make of the UEC an organization oriented against the Party and its policies.

Communists, whether members of the University or not, cannot remain indifferent to this situation. The Party has a legitimate interest in not permitting its policies to be caricatured among the students. It

places its trust in the communist students, and assists them in their constant efforts to render more active and more influential a union of communist students that is loyal to these aims.

When the signatories state that they have no intention "either of weighing responsibilities or of making judgments on the basic issues being debated," and when they choose this moment to send a collective letter to the Party leadership, they are -- intentionally or otherwise -- thereby lending their support to a group that is in open conflict with the Party.

This is the meaning of the step they have taken. It is impossible, however, to overlook the significance of the form which they have given to this step.

#### Activity Contrary to Party Rules

Discussion within the regular Party bodies is necessary.

"In this sense, it is practically perpetual, inasmuch as new problems continually arise that must be met without delay, and the resolute and effective application of the decisions taken always requires a firm conviction on the part of all militants" (Maurice Thorez, participating in the Central Committee session of 9 and 10 May 1956).

The present situation requires of the Party, of every one of its organizations, and of every one of its members, very great political, ideological and organizational activity. Each Party member, just as each Party organization, has the right and the duty to take part in this activity. It is his right freely to voice his opinion within the Party bodies to which he belongs, to make there any criticism or comment he deems justified concerning the activity of the Party and its different bodies, without regard to individuals. If he feels it necessary, he may address himself to the higher bodies, including the Central Committee. Precisely in order to permit each communist to participate in a responsible manner in Party activity, the 17th Congress adopted new regulations favoring and guaranteeing the extension of proletarian democracy. The signatories to the letter consequently had every opportunity of making known their views, while respecting the principles to which every Party member subscribes.

Since the signatories acted outside the organizations to which they belong, and inasmuch as they are Party members in different sections and federations, their collective letter implies an activity that is contrary to Party rules. It is activity of a divisive character that the Party could not countenance without danger of undermining its unity and compromising the efficacy of its action.

Actually, some of these persons have been expressing differences of opinion of this nature ever since 1956. Their ideas have been democratically rejected by conferences of sections, by federal conferences, and by Party Congresses ever since the 14th Congress.



When they failed to make their erroneous positions prevail in the regular Party bodies of which they are members, they regrouped themselves without the knowledge of these bodies. They are carrying on a divisive labor that would lead to the organization of factions and splinter groups that are contrary to Party principles. They are attempting to draw other comrades into this activity.

These concepts were rejected in 1920, when the majority of the Socialist Party, having learned a lesson from the failure of the Second International in 1914, decided to adopt organizational principles that were based on democratic centralism.

The comments or criticism that an individual comrade deems justified are one thing. Violation of the Statutes adopted by the 17th Congress and the Party rules, respect for which rests on the voluntary compliance of every communist, is quite another. This is why the step taken by the signatories to the letter is inadmissible.

We have deemed it necessary to inform you of the above, and to append to the copy of this aforesaid letter these comments by the Party leadership, so that you may study the questions raised and take decisions that are in conformity with Party policy and interests. In any case, we believe it is the duty of each cell to meet in the presence of the interested parties for the purpose of requiring the necessary explanations; to repulse this divisive undertaking; and to obtain from these parties a pledge that they will renounce all activity that is contrary to the rules of the Party.

Please accept, dear Comrades, our fraternal greetings.

The Politburo of the French Communist Party.

Principal and Responsible Editor of NIN  
Rista Tošović, Belgrade.

12 April 1965

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Mr. Chief Editor of NIN!

I consider it my right to address you as "Mr" because you also addressed me thus in the unsigned (and this means editorial) article in yesterday's number of your paper. Naturally I have no illusions in respect to the possibility of you publishing my letter. I am sure that you will remember that a month and a half ago I sent you another letter of protest because of the removal from his duties of the so-called "Chief and Responsible" Editor of the magazine "Kolo" - Sasa Veres, because he had published my article "Dostoevski Today" in the sixth and seventh numbers of his magazine. In that article I "dared" to express the heretical thought that even Christianity as a religion of freedom could form the basis for a proper ordering of society in this country, and not the so-called "natural laws of development" on which the theory of "scientific" socialism is based, and that faith in the indestructability of the individual human soul does not in the least exclude, but rather forms a justification for, this country's struggle for the "primacy of freedom," but this struggle is only negated by reason deprived of faith in immortality. I protested against this because the printing was made impossible, by a harsh administrative procedure, of the third part of my article in which this thought is developed following criticism of the idea of progress as a scientific technical advance in the first and second parts of my study "Dostoevski Today." Of course I did not mean any particular church by the word "Christianity."

You will remember that I warned you that if your paper refused to concern itself (after "Telegram" and "Vjesnik") with this open case of a recurrence of Zhdanovism in our country, I would feel not only free but duty bound to give the details of this whole case to the foreign press and to hand over to them material proof. Nevertheless, even though you refused to publish my letter of protest, I did not do so. Perhaps this was a mistake, but I still believe that Yugoslavia is the most democratic of all the socialist countries and only the possibility that I might inflict damage on Yugoslavia's good reputation in the world deterred me. However, after your article yesterday entitled "The Strange Summer of Mihajlo Mihajlov" I cannot and do not wish to keep silent any longer.

Dear Mr. Chief Editor!

Your publication called me "a White Guard interventionist, a gospodin and representative of White Guard and anti-communist circles!"

(Cont.)

Mr. Chief and Responsible Editor of NIN!

When the Second World War broke out in Europe I was 5 years old (in letters five years). When the Civil War and intervention in Russia stopped and when my parents came to Yugoslavia my father was 17 and my mother 7. My father studied and graduated from a Yugoslav university, did his military service in the Yugoslav Army, actively participated in the Yugoslav National Liberation War, and was for years a director of a Yugoslav scientific institute. I was born in the Yugoslav town of Pančevo, I went to elementary school in the Yugoslav town of Zrenjanin, finished my secondary school training in the Yugoslav town of Sarajevo, studied and graduated in the Yugoslav towns of Belgrade and Zagreb, helped the youth brigades to build the Yugoslav autoput, served in the Yugoslav Army and was elected as a lecturer at a Yugoslav university and in my documents under the subheading "Nationality" is written the word Yugoslav.

I despise you Mr. Tošović!

But not because of myself but because of my friends and my reading public throughout Yugoslavia, I must react to these lies and distortions of my travelogue in the editorial published by your paper.

You probably know very well that I was not in the Soviet Union as a "tourist," as you said on several occasions. I spent a month in the USSR on a so-called "cultural exchange" within the framework of the program of cultural co-operation for 1964 between the U.S.S.R. and the SFRY. A Soviet university lecturer spent one month in Yugoslavia in return. I was not anybody's "guest," and I do not feel bound to lie about what I saw merely out of gratitude for hospitality! So what if I feel more respect towards the Russian people than towards the Soviet authorities. I did not abuse anybody's confidence. I did not write down a single word about my conversations with distinguished Russian authors without in advance receiving their approval whenever it was a case of conversations [literally, contracts] without witnesses. And do not suppose that I was able to write about everything which I discussed and which I learned.

I find myself in an unfair and unequal position in relation to your editorial, which both in general and in particular gives a completely opposite meaning to what I wrote. The second issue of "Delo" was put under a "temporary ban," and the third installment of my travelogue, in which I set forth my most important conclusions after my stay in Moscow, is not even intended for publication. The only course that remains open to me is to appeal to my friends and readers throughout the country to compare the assertions made in your article "The Strange Summer of Mihajlo Mihajlov" with the first part of my travelogue which was not banned and also with the magazine of the Yugoslav Academy of Science and Arts, "Forum" no. 6, 1964, where in my study "The Dead House of Dostoevski and Solzhenytsin" I clearly set forth my attitudes to Stalinism and socialism.

Your editorial is couched in the style of the rudest "practice of ideological justice" from the time of A.A. Zhdanov and is aimed at the intimidation not only and not so much of me, but of all those who have any kind of "original" ideas. I did not reveal any particularly new facts about the USSR. Six or seven years ago articles were appearing in this country which wrote openly about all those things and even in a harsher form. Just think of the book by Margareta Buber-Neumann, "Stalin and Hitler's Exiles," Weisberg-Cibulski's "Conspiracy of Silence," Georgi Klim's "Berlin Kremlin," and so on and so forth. That is to say there is no question here of the facts which I mentioned, but rather of the fact that I mentioned them in an "original" (your term) fashion. The question here is about the fact that I dared without permission to think with my head and to look around me with my own eyes. It is a question of the fact that in a country in which Kmet justice still rules, because the agricultural workers are administratively bound to the Kolhoz, I devoted more attention in an "original" way to the songs which the ordinary Russian people sing than to the flashy publicity of space rockets.

And so you go on to ask: "What are these new ideas" which Mihajlo Mihajlov is thinking of?

Dear Mr. Editor, I have been developing my ideas for many years in a public and open fashion, precisely because Yugoslavia happily is not the Soviet Union, in many articles and essays which have appeared in the pages of Yugoslav papers and magazines ("Telegram," "Vjesnik," "Nase Teme," "Danas," "Kolo," "Kritika," "Forum," "Letopis Matice Srpske," "Delo," "15 dana," "Razlog,") in my broadcasts over the Yugoslav radio, and in public lectures before varied and enormous audiences in Zagreb and Zadar.

I am prepared at any moment, if you will offer me space in your publication, to explain and document all my suppositions and assertions, from scientific data about the rapid increase in alcoholism and hooliganism in the USSR to "the mysticism from the arsenal of the Middle Ages" as my philosophy was described by the critic Miodrag Bogićević in "Komunist" on February 11.

I only wish to mention that one of the people who thinks like me is a well-known enemy of enlightenment of our century who wrote the following words: "The most beautiful excitement which we can experience is mystical. This is the progenitor of all real art and science. The man to whom this excitement is foreign is no longer able to experience wonder nor to stand bewildered and in fearful admiration: it is as if he were dead."

And his name is - Albert Einstein.

Fact Sheet

~~Background Use Only~~  
12 April 1965

Communist comments on the possibility of negotiations on Vietnam:

Peking, People's Daily Editorial, 22 March 1965. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk harps on the hackneyed phrase that if Hanoi stops molesting its neighbors, peace will be restored promptly. This is sheer nonsense! Does the Johnson administration intend to wait for the day there is a 'sign' that the Vietnamese people will stop fighting? Let them wait. That day will never come just as the sun will never rise in the west."

General Vo Nguyen Giap, DRV Defense Minister in an interview with Japanese television delegation headed by Suzuki, in response to question regarding the possibility of a political settlement of the war.

"The U.S. Government must immediately stop its aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, end the aggressive war in South Vietnam, withdraw all U.S. troops and weapons from there and let the South Vietnamese people settle their own affairs by themselves in accordance with the program of the NFLSV."

NCNA Report on anti-U.S. rally in Hanoi, 22 March 1965.

"U.S. imperialism babbles about a 'peaceful solution,' but this is just a cunning trick of U.S. imperialism that tries to turn black into white and wrong into right.... Anyone who believes in U.S. 'sincerity' will surely come to grief."

Peking, NCNA, 2 April 1965, comment on President Johnson's statement that the U.S. desires peaceful solution to Vietnam problem.

"Johnson's lip-service to 'peace' and 'negotiations' cannot cover the essence of his statement as a stupid and clumsy distortion of facts.... The Vietnamese people will fight resolutely until final victory and until there is not a single U.S. aggressor left in their country. No matter what tricks they play, they will be defeated."

Speech by Hoang Quoc Viet, presidium-member of Vietnam Fatherland Front in Hanoi on 21 March 1965.

"Taking advantage of the just concern of many people throughout the world, the U.S. ruling circles are talking of 'negotiations,' and 'peaceful solutions.' This is a deceitful trick of the U.S. imperialists aimed at getting them out of their present predicament in South Vietnam. The so-called 'political solution' about which the U.S. government is talking can fool no one."

And another important contemporary Marxist figure, Lucien Goldmann, has written this: "We are... completely in agreement with the idea... that modern socialist thought has been able to begin and to thrive only within the intellectual and affective world which Christian thought and culture created...." - L. Goldmann, ("Dialectical Explorations," page 92, Sarajevo 1962).

Mr. Editor. I do not hide the fact that I consider Solovjev, Emanuel Mounier, Theillard de Chardin, Aurobinda, Shestov and Berdjajev to be more human, more profound and greater thinkers than any other living Marxist philosopher. I do not conceal the fact that I consider myself a Christian.

You newspaper will not frighten me by accusing me of "anti-communism." Believe me I am not the only person who feels that it was the one and same hand which killed Garcia Lorca, Maksim Gorky, Dimitrije Tukovic and Tukhachevski, Patrice Lumumba and Imre Nagy. I am deeply convinced that every increase in the strength of Stalinism at the same time signifies and assists the growth of neo-Nazism and if your attitude were to gain the upper hand in Yugoslavia - however paradoxical this might appear, this would strengthen McCarthyism even there in the USA.

I will take legal action against your newspaper for insulting and maliciously misleading our public.

Since I am convinced that you will not publish this letter, I am sending copies to the Editorial Boards of the Yugoslav newspapers.

(signed Mahajlov Mihajlo  
University Lecturer in the town of  
Zadar, a town which the latest edition  
of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia describes as "an American military base on the Mediterranean.")

C.S. MONITOR  
19 March 1965

CPYRGHT

# *Peking's influence seen in Ceylon*

By Sharokh Sabavala  
Special correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Colombo, Ceylon

Teen-agers may well decide the outcome of Ceylon's sixth general election since independence.

What is called the "over-18 category," about 20 percent of Ceylon's total voting strength, is polling for the first time March 22 to heighten the unpredictable outcome.

Ceylon has had five parliaments since Britain withdrew here in 1948.

The sixth may be dominated either by the grand leftist alliance, led by the world's only woman Premier, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, or by an ostensible middle-roader, the three-times Premier and a former premier's son, Dudley Senanayake of the United National Party (UNP).

Or, as in nearby Kerala, India, no one may get a clear-cut majority. This would leave the decision in the hands of Ceylon Tamils — former Indian settlers — further to complicate matters and create new unpleasantness between this island and India.

Mrs. Bandaranaike's alliance is led by her late husband's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) contesting a hundred seats.

Other coalitionists with 24 and nine seats respectively are the Trotskyites and Communists.

Premier Bandaranaike in a 14-point program offers her people government control of the press, banking, and agency houses, a wider public sector of the economy, and a rightful place for Buddhism.

Her main opponent—the United National Party—is pledged to democratic socialism, a mixed economy, and civil liberties. The latter party, which ruled Ceylon for the first freedom decade, is traditionally known as the party of the upper and middle classes led by Westernized Sinhalese.

## **Socialism urged**

But recently it appears to have gone out for more indigenous grass-roots support.

There is a third contestant. The leftist half of the victorious Bandaranaike coalition of 1956, it is known as the People's Front. It is led by Philip Gunawardena. The front is aiming to "establish a socialist state in keeping with Sinhalese religious and cultural traditions." It denounces the UNP as capitalist and the SLFP as feudal and neocolonial.

To the correspondent fresh from the sights and sounds of Kerala's tangled web, Ceylon's hectic political scene looks all too familiar. There appears to be the same undertow of parochial groupism, the same clash of caste and clan.

But there's one exception.

Whereas in Kerala, Communist China seemed still a distant echo, here its influence seems to be very much a part of the electoral battle.

Last month a section of the Colombo press reported that Chinese Communist nationals — Peking operates a full-scale embassy here — had bought some 400 maps from the surveyor general's office showing Ceylon's electorate, constituencies, and roads.

Last week the Times of Ceylon quoted former Lands Minister C. P. Desilva [his resignation last December toppled the Bandaranaike government] as saying that ships of the Chinese Peoples's Republic were receiving preferential treatment in Ceylon ports. He added that the Sino-Ceylon maritime agreement of 1963 gives the Chinese Communists free access to all harbor facilities.

Premier Bandaranaike says this is "utterly irresponsible and false."

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LONDON TIMES  
16 March 1965

## CEYLON PACT WITH CHINA ATTACKED

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT  
COLOMBO, MARCH 15

The intricacies of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute may not be apparent to the average voter, but as Ceylon's general election enters the home stretch the Opposition parties are hoping to romp past the winning post by spotlighting the dangers of Chinese and Soviet interest in the election.

A maritime pact with China has become one of the biggest election issues. While the Government maintains that the agreement, signed two years ago, is a purely commercial one covering cargo vessels which operate between the two countries, the Opposition parties claim

that it could lead to involvement in the Sino-Indian imbroglio. Mrs. Bandaranaike, the Prime Minister, has gone on record as saying that in the event of war the terms of the agreement would be subject to review.

Mr. Dudley Senanayake, leader of the Opposition United National Party, declared that it would take Ceylon at least six months to persuade the Chinese to abdicate their right to use Ceylon's harbours, and by that time Ceylon would have become a target for India and would suffer all the damage of war. Another line of assault on the maritime pact is that if Ceylon seeks to abrogate it China can hit back by repudiating the rubber-rice barter agreement.

### BEST CUSTOMER

Opposition interests are also asking why Ceylon has such pacts only with China and Russia and not, for example, with Britain, which is still Ceylon's best customer. The Government's answer is that "so far as the

Government is concerned, we are prepared to sign similar agreements with any country with whom we have diplomatic relations and who wish to conclude such agreements".

Besides the election emphasis on Chinese designs, the fact that three Russian trawlers are in Colombo harbour has led to speculation about Soviet intentions. The newspapers, which are pace setters for the Opposition in the same way that Radio Ceylon is the voice of the Government, have asked whether Ceylon intends to allow Russian "trawlers" fishing rights in troubled waters. The Government has wearily and unofficially replied that no agreement will be signed with a Soviet fisheries team now in Ceylon at least until after the election.

The newspapers also claim that there will be an ideological post-mortem between the Russians and China; after the elections, a claim based, of course, on the assumption that Mrs. Bandaranaike's Government faces defeat.